Since the fall of the former Assad regime on December 8 and the formation of a caretaker government led by Mohammad Al-Bashir the next day—and throughout the subsequent phases up to the present—a recurring pattern has emerged in the style of governance.
This pattern cannot be explained solely by the absence of official media, which has gradually resumed operations. Rather, it appears to be a deliberate governmental approach. This approach involves issuing decisions or leaks informally, allowing the government the opportunity to withdraw or disavow them if they face public rejection. Syrians have come to call this the "policy of testing the waters." In this report, Verify Syria team breaks down the most prominent decisions that were either reversed, disavowed, or left uncommented on.
In late December 2024, Syrian media outlets and social media pages reported that journalist Mohammad Al-Faisal had been appointed spokesperson for the interim Syrian government. At the time, our team obtained official statements confirming the news.
However, on January 24, more than three weeks after the initial reports, Al-Faisal officially denied the appointment on his Telegram account.
In January, Arab and local media widely circulated news that Diala Barakat had been reappointed as Minister of Culture in Ahmed Al-Bashir's government—a post she had held in the government of Mohammad Ghazi Al-Jalali, the last of the ousted regime.
But on January 23, the Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Information sent a message to our team at Verify Syria retracting its earlier confirmation of the appointment. It stated that no official appointment had been made and that the ministry post remained vacant. It described the earlier confirmation of Barakat’s reappointment as a "mistake" without clarifying its nature.
Yet on January 30, just days after the official denial, Syrian actor Qasim Melho mentioned in a Facebook post that they had communicated with the Minister of Culture and agreed to form a temporary council to manage the Artists' Syndicate—revealing that Diala Barakat was indeed still holding the post, and the position had not been vacant.
On January 21, the Media Relations Office of the Syrian Ministry of Information confirmed to our team, in an exclusive statement, the accuracy of reports circulating on social media that the General Authority of Tartous Port had canceled its investment contract with the Russian company and had asked it to leave the port. The office also confirmed the authenticity of a statement attributed to the Director of Tartous Customs, indicating that the agreement with the Russian company to invest in Tartous Port had been annulled.
However, on February 28, Dmitry Trifonov, CEO of the Moscow-based STG Engineering, told Reuters that his company was still managing the port and had not been notified of any contract cancellation. He noted that such a process, if it were to happen, would be lengthy and bureaucratically complex.
In a similar pattern, unofficial promotions were observed for commanders from factions formerly known as the Syrian National Army before the regime’s collapse. Among them was commander Mohammad Jassim, popularly known as Abu Amsha, leader of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division. He was reportedly promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in the new Syrian army and appointed commander of the 25th Division, stationed in Hama province.
Al-Jassim identifies himself as holding the rank of Brigadier General in the new Syrian army on his personal account on Platform X.
Similarly, Saif Al-Din Boulad, leader of the Hamza Division, began referring to himself in a March statement on X as the commander of the 76th Division of the new army, thanking interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra for promoting him to Brigadier General.
However, no official confirmation or denial of these promotions appeared on the Syrian Presidency's Telegram account or on the Syrian Ministry of Defense's official channels. The only officially announced promotions were posted on the “General Command” Telegram channel—later renamed to the Syrian Presidency—on Dec 29 and 31 Dec, 2024.
That list was described as the “first bulletin.” Later, statements reported by Reuters revealed that this list included names of foreign fighters integrated into the new armed forces.
Two Syrian sources confirmed to Reuters that the new Syrian rulers had incorporated several foreign fighters—including Uyghurs, a Jordanian, and a Turk—into the new army's ranks.
According to the sources, at least six foreigners were appointed to military positions among about 50 newly created posts. A source from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham described the move as symbolic, honoring the sacrifices of “jihadists” in the fight against the Assad regime.
On Wednesday, April 16, Dr. Amin Abdul Latif Suleiman, Director General of Al-Mouwasat University Hospital, issued a decision to separate men and women on the hospital’s employee shuttle buses, with men seated in front and women in the back, regardless of job title.
In a statement to the local Al-Watan newspaper on Sunday, April 20, a hospital official expressed surprise at the public uproar over what was described as an internal organizational decision regarding seating arrangements. The official added that the decision had already been canceled, though it was originally in response to a specific incident on one of the buses.
One incident that sparked wide controversy on social media—without any official comment—was the decision to divide the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus into two sections: one for men and the other for women.
Later, the decision was quietly reversed without formal announcement, deepening public confusion and speculation about who had issued the decision and who had reversed it.
Our team, at Verify Syria, published a detailed investigative report on the incident on April 21.
On April 22, Issam Sukkar, director of the Umayyad Mosque, confirmed in a video report by Asharq Al-Awsat that the separation of men and women had indeed been implemented, though he noted that exceptions were made for political groups
In the absence of official statements and with government bodies hesitant to publicly assume responsibility for their decisions, Syrians have begun to approach news from the new administration with considerable caution.
The ongoing “testing the waters” policy across multiple sectors may be seen as a way to absorb public anger or gauge the general mood—but it also raises serious questions about transparency, the stability of political decision-making, and the future of institutions in the new Syria.